Hi! I want to try out fedora workstation in the near future (once 39 is out) and was wondering if systemd-homed is ready for everyday use yet.
I'm a bit paranoid and really need my private data encrypted. However, I don't think that full disk encryption is practical for my daily use. Therefore I was really looking forward to the encryption possibilities of systemd-homed.
However, after reading up on it, I was a bit discouraged. AFAIK, there's no option to setup systemd-homed at installation (of fedora). I was an Arch then Manjaro, then Endeavour user for years but don't have the time/patience anymore to configure major parrts of my system anymore. Also, the documentation doesn't seem too noob-friendly to me, which also plays into the time/patience argument.
Is it ready? Can anyone seriously recommend it for a lazy ex-Arch user who doesn't want to break another linux installation?
Thank you in advance. :)
I need more than data security at rest. Reading out the keys from ram is well within my threat model.
In that case systemd won't help you either.
Care to elaborate why? I thought that systemd can encrypt your home partition when locking your device.
When locking the device sure, but you could achieve a higher level of security by turning off the machine, or using hibernate with encrypted swap. Boot on my machine with FDE and an NVME sad literally takes seconds anyway…
Haha are you serious? In that case nothing short of full disk encryption and secure boot with your own keys is remotely adequate. Do you realize, that just encrypting your /home is at most a mild obscurity measure? If an attacker has potentially access to your computer and parts of it are unencrypted or unsigned, they could easily install a keylogger that sends out your data and/or password the next time you use your computer?!
If your situation is not just a psychological case of paranoia, but a real threat, then you absolutely need to work on your security knowledge a good amount!
I don't really hppreciate your tone. Could you be a little less of a dick, please?
Keyloggers aren't in my threat model (i.e.: they aren't in the MO of my potential attackers).