Until I find the bloody proposal that none of it's detractors seems to dare link to, I'm going to assume that I, as a citizen of EU, has a clear and present interest in not having Mozilla et al using their control of our browsers to block government services.
I can do without my browser suddenly deciding that it doesn't trust the fire department, thank you very much.
(Or the pharmacy, or my doctor, or, or or at lot of things.)
They haven't released the text publicly but they're voting on it in less than a week. That's also one of the many objections that Mozilla et al has to this whole thing: it's basically being done in secret in a way that won't give the public any time to react or object.
Historically, the browser vendors have only distrusted certificate authorities when they had reason to not trust them, not some arbitrary reason.
Even if all of the EU states turn out to be completely trustworthy, forcing browser vendors to trust the EU CAs would give more political cover for other states to force browser vendors to trust their CAs. Ones that definitely should not be trusted.
I think there wouldn't be nearly the same level of objection if it was limited to each country's CC TLD, rather than any domain on the internet.
Until I find the bloody proposal that none of it's detractors seems to dare link to, I'm going to assume that I, as a citizen of EU, has a clear and present interest in not having Mozilla et al using their control of our browsers to block government services.
I can do without my browser suddenly deciding that it doesn't trust the fire department, thank you very much.
(Or the pharmacy, or my doctor, or, or or at lot of things.)
They haven't released the text publicly but they're voting on it in less than a week. That's also one of the many objections that Mozilla et al has to this whole thing: it's basically being done in secret in a way that won't give the public any time to react or object.
Historically, the browser vendors have only distrusted certificate authorities when they had reason to not trust them, not some arbitrary reason.
One of the examples of them preventing a CA from being trusted is Kazakhstan's, which was specifically set up to enable them to intercept users' traffic: https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2020/12/18/kazakhstan-root-2020/
Even if all of the EU states turn out to be completely trustworthy, forcing browser vendors to trust the EU CAs would give more political cover for other states to force browser vendors to trust their CAs. Ones that definitely should not be trusted.
I think there wouldn't be nearly the same level of objection if it was limited to each country's CC TLD, rather than any domain on the internet.