NS2 was dead to Russia as soon as the recent invasion started. To Germany it was leverage to keep Russia in line, and to Russia it was leverage to keep Germany out of the action. Russia thought they were calling Germany’s bluff when invading, but Germany held their word and stepped away from the deal. From that point Russia was projected to lose money on the pipeline instead of making it - there was no practical use for it anymore.
You’ve got a pipeline costing you money, antagonistic countries that don’t believe your threats, and your own country has failed to fall in line with the war effort (naturally since it wasn’t even marketed to them as a war).
Blow it up while “blaming” someone else and you could fix three problems in one shot. And the risk is low - no matter who blew it up, all of the agencies who know the culprit can’t say anything because the operational advantage to doing so is practically non-existent.
It’s going to fuel conspiracies and hysteria among the masses which can be taken advantage of to dampen the enemy morale, and the enemy will just have to sit their and watch it without saying a word. Threats of nuclear attacks are much more convincing to foreign populations primed in this way.
Or else the intel agencies do say something, and you take that tiny faux pas and apply immense pressure to crack it open and gain actionable information on intel practices. The people at home won’t believe foreign agencies anyway and they are the ones that most need to be kept in the dark.
I’m not convinced that any country except Russia had a strongly compelling reason to destroy it. Had Germany yielded in February and traded its support to Ukraine for a pipeline from Russia, that could have been different. But by the sabotage in September, any hope that Germany was bluffing had died. The years of effort that went into making NS2 possible had become a sunk cost.
My runner up conclusions are: 1. The state-corporate consortium initiating a cause for insurance payouts, 2. Germany forcing itself to stand by its decision, or 3. the US being so dumb it could only be considered an irrational actor.
NS2 was dead to Russia as soon as the recent invasion started. To Germany it was leverage to keep Russia in line, and to Russia it was leverage to keep Germany out of the action. Russia thought they were calling Germany’s bluff when invading, but Germany held their word and stepped away from the deal. From that point Russia was projected to lose money on the pipeline instead of making it - there was no practical use for it anymore.
You’ve got a pipeline costing you money, antagonistic countries that don’t believe your threats, and your own country has failed to fall in line with the war effort (naturally since it wasn’t even marketed to them as a war).
Blow it up while “blaming” someone else and you could fix three problems in one shot. And the risk is low - no matter who blew it up, all of the agencies who know the culprit can’t say anything because the operational advantage to doing so is practically non-existent.
It’s going to fuel conspiracies and hysteria among the masses which can be taken advantage of to dampen the enemy morale, and the enemy will just have to sit their and watch it without saying a word. Threats of nuclear attacks are much more convincing to foreign populations primed in this way.
Or else the intel agencies do say something, and you take that tiny faux pas and apply immense pressure to crack it open and gain actionable information on intel practices. The people at home won’t believe foreign agencies anyway and they are the ones that most need to be kept in the dark.
I’m not convinced that any country except Russia had a strongly compelling reason to destroy it. Had Germany yielded in February and traded its support to Ukraine for a pipeline from Russia, that could have been different. But by the sabotage in September, any hope that Germany was bluffing had died. The years of effort that went into making NS2 possible had become a sunk cost.
My runner up conclusions are: 1. The state-corporate consortium initiating a cause for insurance payouts, 2. Germany forcing itself to stand by its decision, or 3. the US being so dumb it could only be considered an irrational actor.
I guess I just don’t think like a Russian then.